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Large  outbreaks  of zoonotic  inﬂuenza  A virus  (IAV)  infections  may  presage  an  inﬂuenza  pandemic.  How-
ever, the  likelihood  that an  airborne-transmissible  variant  evolves  upon  zoonotic  infection  or  co-infection
with  zoonotic  and  seasonal  IAVs  remains  poorly  understood,  as  does  the  relative  importance  of  accu-
mulating  mutations  versus  re-assortment  in  this  process.  Using  discrete-time  probabilistic  models,  we
determined  quantitative  probability  ranges  that transmissible  variants  with  1–5 mutations  and  trans-
missible  re-assortants  evolve  after a given  number  of  zoonotic  IAV  infections.  The  systematic  exploration
of  a large  population  of model  parameter  values  was  designed  to account  for uncertainty  and  variabil-
ity in  inﬂuenza  virus  infection,  epidemiological  and evolutionary  processes.  The  models  suggested  that
immunocompromised  individuals  are  at high  risk  of  generating  IAV  variants  with  pandemic  potential  by
accumulation  of  mutations.  Yet,  both  immunocompetent  and  immunocompromised  individuals  could
generate  high  viral  loads  of  single  and  double  mutants,  which  may  facilitate  their  onward  transmis-
sion  and  the  subsequent  accumulation  of  additional  1–2  mutations  in newly-infected  individuals.  This
may  result  in the evolution  of  a full transmissible  genotype  along  short  chains  of  contact  transmission.
Although  co-infection  with  zoonotic  and  seasonal  IAVs was  shown  to be a  rare  event,  it  consistently
resulted  in  high  viral  loads  of re-assortants,  which  may  facilitate  their  onward  transmission  among
humans.  The  prevention  or limitation  of zoonotic  IAV  infection  in immunocompromised  and  contact
individuals,  including  health  care  workers,  as  well  as vaccination  against  seasonal  IAVs—limiting  the  risk
of  co-infection—should  be  considered  fundamental  tools  to  thwart  the evolution  of a novel  pandemic  IAV
by  accumulation  of mutations  and re-assortment.
©  2015  The  Authors.  Published  by  Elsevier  Ltd. This  is an  open  access  article  under  the CC  BY-NC-ND. Introduction
Inﬂuenza A viruses (IAVs) impose high morbidity and mortal-
ty burdens on humans, during recurrent seasonal epidemics and
ue to IAVs’ ability to escape built-up herd immunity through anti-
enic drift [1]. Their adaptability also fuels the looming threat
f antigenic shift that may  lead to a novel pandemic. Inﬂuenza
andemics are caused by novel zoonotic IAVs that eventually are
fﬁciently transmitted among humans. However, upon zoonotic
ransmission, animal IAVs are typically unable of sustained human-
o-human transmission via the airborne route. Evolution of an
irborne-transmissible variant is considered a prerequisite to the
mergence of an inﬂuenza pandemic [2].
∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail address: l.reperant@artemisonehealth.com (L.A. Reperant).
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.vaccine.2015.10.056
264-410X/© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article 
/).license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
The adaptability of IAVs is largely governed by their genetic
versatility, driven by the accumulation of mutations and genome
re-assortment. IAV RNA genome replication lacks effective exonu-
clease proofreading capability, leading to high nucleotide mutation
rates [3]. In addition, IAVs’ segmented genome allows for re-
assortment upon simultaneous infection with other IAVs, resulting
in new viruses containing gene segments of mixed parental origin,
e.g. with surface proteins of different subtypes. IAV re-assortment
has played a key role in the emergence of past pandemic viruses [1],
and appears to occur more frequently in humans than previously
appreciated [4].
A number of IAVs circulating in swine and poultry pose substan-
tial pandemic risks due to their widespread distribution in animal
populations, and repeated zoonotic infections in humans. These
include highly pathogenic avian inﬂuenza viruses (HPAIV)-H5N1
and low pathogenic avian inﬂuenza viruses (LPAIV)-H7N9, which
have caused more than 800 and close to 700 cases of zoonotic
under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.
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nfection with mortality rates of about 50% and 40%, respectively.
espite such large numbers of zoonotic infections, which provide
pportunities for these viruses to develop airborne transmissibility
n humans, their efﬁcient transmission from human to human has
ot yet been observed.
Experimentally, re-assortment between zoonotic and seasonal
AVs can result in the development of airborne-transmissible
iruses in mammals [5–8]. Also in the absence of re-assortment,
he accumulation of a relatively limited number of mutations in
oonotic IAV genomes can result in their efﬁcient transmission
mong mammals [9–12]. The minimum set of mutations that may
onfer airborne transmissibility to zoonotic IAVs in humans is not
nown but may  be informed by animal studies. For example, ﬁve
utations in the genome of HPAIV-H5N1 and HPAIV-H7N1 were
ufﬁcient for or associated with airborne transmissibility in the
erret model [9,11,12]. Single and double mutations belonging to
hese sets of ﬁve mutations have been reported to naturally occur
n HPAIV-H5N1 and LPAIV-H7N9 circulating in poultry [12,13].
et, how likely the accumulation of the additional three muta-
ions assumed to confer airborne transmissibility are to evolve, and
ow this compares with the likelihood of re-assortment remains
nanswered [14].
Theoretical frameworks combining IAVs’ evolutionary and epi-
emic dynamics have been developed in recent years, shedding
ight on the mechanisms of seasonal IAV global evolution, largely
riven by the interplay of cross-immunity and seasonality [15–21].
ost approaches explored the extent of IAVs’ evolution at the level
f the human population, with selection acting upon IAV trans-
ission. Likewise, the emergence of pandemic IAVs in humans
as been modeled mathematically mainly from a population-level
erspective, once chains of human-to-human transmission occur
14,22–24].
The conditions favoring the initial evolution of transmissible
ariants of zoonotic IAVs within individual hosts are remark-
bly little understood, yet govern the ﬁrst step required for the
mergence of a pandemic virus. High polymerase error rate, pos-
tive within-host selection, long lasting infection or the presence
f functionally-equivalent substitutions can increase the likeli-
ood of evolution of a transmissible variant by accumulation
f mutations in an individual host [13]. However, virus–host
nteractions, and in particular the host immune response, limits
he growth of variants that evolve during infection, complicat-
ng the within-host dynamics of emergence [25]. Furthermore,
ncertainties in infection, evolutionary and epidemiological pro-
esses call for the exploration of an extremely wide range
f model parameter values, making the prognosis for within-
ost evolution of a variant with pandemic potential a daunting
ask [13].
In the present study, we address this issue by modeling the evo-
ution of novel variants during the growth phase of viral replication,
sing a discrete-time probabilistic approach that explores a com-
rehensive range of plausible scenarios by attributing all model
arameter values, speciﬁc distributions ranging between lower-
nd higher-bound estimates, as informed by data. We  used Latin
ypercube sampling for uncertainty analyses and risk quantiﬁca-
ion. The proposed approach generated quantile risk estimates of
he within-host evolution of IAVs with pandemic potential, by accu-
ulation of mutations and re-assortment.
. Materials and methodsThe technical details of the proposed discrete-time probabilistic
odel of IAV infection and evolution are provided in the Supple-
entary Material, and are essentially summarized below.33 (2015) 6955–6966
2.1. Within-host model of inﬂuenza virus replication growth
phase
The growth phase of IAV replication during infection of an indi-
vidual was  assumed log-linear, in line with viral shedding curves
in volunteers infected with seasonal IAVs [26]. It was considered a
discrete succession of replication steps (Fig. 1), and deﬁned by four
parameters: time of peak replication, duration of peak virus pro-
duction, duration of a replication step, and number of virus copies
produced during a peak replication step.
We considered IAV infection to range between the typically
acute IAV infection seen during seasonal inﬂuenza in otherwise
healthy individuals—with short shedding peak as early as one day
post infection and prompt resolution of infection—to less typical
representations observed upon zoonotic infection or in individuals
with comorbidities. For example, high viral loads of HPAIV-H5N1
were reported in human patients at the time of death, occur-
ring between four days and two  weeks after illness onset [27–29].
This suggests late shedding peaks possibly maintained over a long
period of time. Likewise, immunocompromised individuals typi-
cally exhibit long lasting infections with high IAV replication levels
maintained over one or more weeks [30]. We thus considered IAV
shedding peak to occur as late as six days post infection, and IAV
peak production to be maintained for up to 14 days (Table 1).
We  assumed that the maximum number of viral copies pro-
duced at zoonotic IAV replication peak during an individual
infection in humans was of the order of 1012 to 1014, based on
earlier estimates and on limited data on HPAIV-H5N1 viral loads
in human lungs[13,29] (Table 1). Both the duration of IAV replica-
tion steps, and of the infectivity of IAV particles was set at 12 h, in
line with experimental data[31]. We  constrained the combinations
of infection parameter values so that the number of infected cells
at the time of peak replication did not exceed the estimated total
number of respiratory epithelial cells in the human respiratory tract
(Supplementary Material).
2.1.1. Model of virus evolution by accumulation of mutations
The probability of evolution of variants with speciﬁc sets of i
mutations at each replication step was  calculated using the bino-
mial probability mass function [32] (Supplementary Information).
It was essentially based on (1) the probability that a virus parti-
cle produced during a replication step has i nucleotide mutations;
(2) the number of mutants with any possible combination of i
nucleotide mutations; and (3) the total number of wild-type and
mutant virus copies produced during that replication step (Fig. 1).
The probability of evolution by accumulation of mutations thus
depended on the following parameters: IAV polymerase error
rate, wild-type replication rate and mutant relative replication
rates.
The inﬂuenza polymerase error rate is in the order of 10−5 per
nucleotide per genome replication [3]. Based on the distributions of
unique equine and swine mutant IAVs rescued from experimentally
infected and unvaccinated horses and pigs, respectively [33,34]
(Fig. 2), we  assumed that it may  take any value between 10−5.2
and 10−4.2 per nucleotide per genome replication (Table 1). This
range allowed accounting for uncertainties in probability distribu-
tions and biological heterogeneities, including variable mutation
rate within and across IAV gene segments, possibly affecting the
accumulation of mutations (Supplementary Material).
Most mutations occurring during IAV replication may  be delete-
rious, resulting in no further replication of IAV mutants. However,
some polymerase gene mutations marking adaptation of avian IAVs
to mammals can increase mutant replication by factors ranging
between 0.5 and 1.0 log [35,36]. Accordingly, the mutant rela-
tive replication rates were assumed to take any value between
the lower-bound estimate of zero (corresponding to deleterious
L.A. Reperant et al. / Vaccine 33 (2015) 6955–6966 6957
Fig. 1. General approach of the discrete-time probabilistic model of within-host infection. (A) Infection growth curves are deﬁned by the time of peak replication, the duration
of  a replication step and the number of virus copies produced at peak replication. (B) IAV polymerase error rate drives the evolution of variants with one or more mutations.
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y  the immune response and do not increase in numbers. In an immunocompromi
o  that of the wild-type virus. (E) Reassortants are produced upon co-infection of ce
utations) and the higher-bound estimate of 10 (corresponding
o a log increase in mutant replication compared to that of the
ild-type virus; Table 1).
We used a discrete-time multi-type branching process [37] tostimate the number of mutants with 1–5 mutations. The numbers
f variants with speciﬁc sets of 1–5 mutations were expressed as a
unction of the time to zoonotic IAV peak replication. Numbers of
ariants with speciﬁc sets of 1–5 mutations that were below one4 days. In an immunocompetent individual, replicating mutant IAVs are controlled
dividuals, the number of replicating mutant IAVs increase up to levels comparable
th both zoonotic and seasonal IAVs. (F) Fit re-assortants may  further replicate.
at any given replication step corresponded to their probability of
evolution in one individual at that replication step.
We further evaluated the numbers of variants with speciﬁc sets
of 1–5 mutations when IAV peak production levels were main-
tained, under conditions characteristic of immunocompetent and
immunocompromised individuals (Supplementary Material). We
recently showed that in immunocompetent individuals, the growth
of variants that evolve during infection is limited by the host
6958 L.A. Reperant et al. / Vaccine 33 (2015) 6955–6966
Table 1
List of the model parameter, ranges and distributions.
Parameter Lower bound estimate Higher bound estimate LHS distributions CLHS distributions
Time of replication peak (days) 1 6 Uniform (constrained) Gamma (shape = 1, rate = 0.1; constrained)
Duration of viral peak production
(days)
1 14 Uniform (constrained) Gamma (shape = 1, rate = 0.1; constrained)
Peak  number of virus copies 1012 1014 Uniform (constrained) Uniform (constrained)
IAV  polymerase error rate per
nucleotide per genome replication
10−5.2 10−4.2 Uniform Uniform
Mutant/reassortant-to-wild-type
IAV  relative replication rate
0 10 Uniform Gamma (shape = 1, rate = 1)
Seasonal IAV attack rate in children
(≤17 years old)
5% 72% Uniform Gamma (shape = 2, rate = 28)
Seasonal IAV attack rate in adults
(>18 years old)
1.5% 27% Uniform Gamma (shape = 2, rate = 13)
Daily  proportion of seasonal
inﬂuenza cases in the northern
Western Paciﬁc Region (WPROn)
0.13% 0.81% Uniform Gamma (shape = 12, rate = 2623)†
† Fitted to data by maximum likelihood.
Fig. 2. Distributions of the time (A) and duration (B) of wild-type IAV peak replication in the LHS- (gray) and CLHS-based (red) models. (C) Polymerase error rate distribution
from  best-ﬁt binomial probability (plain line) and beta-binomial probability (dashed line) of evolution of variants with 1–5 mutations, against observed probability for equine
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o 10−4.2 per nucleotide per genome replication.
mmune response, with the absence of variant growth at and after
eak replication of the wild-type virus [25]. In contrast, in immuno-
ompromised individuals, the growth of variants is unaffected,
nd independent of the time of their evolution. Consequently, in
mmunocompetent individuals, each mutant virus particle was
ssumed to give rise to one new virion at each peak replication step,
ndependently of the mutant replication rate, because of immune-
ediated control (Fig. 1). In immunocompromised individuals,
utant viruses were assumed to replicate at full replication rate,
p to peak replication levels comparable to that of the wild-type
irus (Fig. 1). Although viral titers tend to reach higher levels in
mmunocompromised individuals [30], we constrained each vari-
nt’s replication to the corresponding wild-type virus peak level of
012–1014 virus particles for comparison purposes.
.1.2. Virus evolution by re-assortment
Individuals with zoonotic inﬂuenza may  become co-infected
ith seasonal IAV, or vice versa, providing opportunities for re-
ssortment. We  ﬁrst calculated the probability of evolution of a
peciﬁc re-assortant between zoonotic and seasonal IAVs upon binomial probabilities calculated with polymerase error rate ranging from 10−5.2
co-infection. The probability of evolution of a speciﬁc re-assortant
at each replication step was based on (1) the number of cells
infected during the previous replication step; (2) the probability
that a cell is infected with two  or more IAV virions; (3) the prob-
ability that IAVs with gene segments of mixed parental origin are
produced; (4) the total number of possible re-assortants; and (5)
the re-assortant relative replication rate. The probability of evolu-
tion by re-assortment thus depended on the following parameters:
the time of peak replication and the peak numbers of zoonotic
and seasonal IAVs, which themselves deﬁne the peak number of
infected cells and the replication rates of the wild-type viruses
(Supplementary Material), and the re-assortant relative replication
rate.
The probability that a cell is infected with one or more IAV
particles depends on the multiplicity of infection [32], which is
essentially equal to the percentage of infected cells (Supplementary
Material). The probability that upon co-infection, a virion produced
by an infected cell harbors either full parental genomes, or any
combination of gene segments of mixed origin, is governed by the
proportion of zoonotic and seasonal IAV upon co-infection. We
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onsidered that either both zoonotic and seasonal IAVs initiated
o-infection at T = 0, or that infection with seasonal IAV occurred
ne or more replication steps after infection with the zoonotic IAV.
stimated co-infection rates were similar to those found in vitro for
ow multiplicities of infection [38,39].
The re-assortant relative replication rates were assumed to take
ny value between the lower-bound estimate of zero (correspond-
ng to re-assortment mismatch) and the higher-bound estimate of
0 (corresponding to a log increase in re-assortant replication com-
ared to that of the parental zoonotic virus; Table 1). Numbers of
peciﬁc re-assortants that were below one at any given replication
tep corresponded to their probability of evolution in one individual
t that replication step.
.1.3. Co-infection with zoonotic and seasonal IAVs
Only co-infection with different IAVs inoculated less than 24 h
part produced viable re-assortants in vitro and in animal mod-
ls [38,40]. The risk of evolution of speciﬁc re-assortants was  thus
ssumed to depend on the daily (24 h) probability that an individual
ith zoonotic inﬂuenza is co-infected with seasonal IAV. Because of
uch short delay between infection with both zoonotic and seasonal
AVs, it is unlikely that the individual already shows severe signs
r symptoms of zoonotic inﬂuenza that may  alter his/her exposure
isk at the time of co-infection with seasonal IAV. We  therefore
ssumed independence between the two events.
The probability of co-infection, given previous infection with
oonotic IAV, was based on the seasonality and relative attack rates
f seasonal IAV in children and adults. Based on published epidemi-
logical studies [41–43], the average attack rate of seasonal IAV
ypically ranges between 5% and 20% and has been estimated at an
verage of 15% (SD = 3%) in individuals <18 years old (children) and
t an average of 7% (SD = 2%) in individuals ≥18 years old (adults)
41]. Using sentinel data of seasonal IAV infection from the WHO
luNet database (http://www.who.int/inﬂuenza/gisrs laboratory/
unet/), we determined the daily proportion of annual cases of
easonal IAV infection in the respective WHO  regions. Because
oth HPAIV-H5N1 and LPAIV-H7N9 are endemic in poultry popula-
ions in China, we used data from the northern West Paciﬁc region
WPROn), which includes China, Japan, Mongolia and the Republic
f Korea, for the calculations of the risk of co-infection (Supplemen-
ary Material).
.1.4. Sensitivity analyses and quantitative risk assessment
Sensitivity analyses and risk estimate ranges were assessed by
atin and conditioned Latin hypercube sampling (LHS and CLHS,
espectively) of the model parameters [44,45]. Brieﬂy, each of the
odel parameters was assigned a uniform or gamma  distribu-
ion ranging from the lower- to higher-bound parameter estimates
Table 1). The number of simulations was set at 10,000: each of
he distributions was divided into non-overlapping equi-probable
ntervals, creating 10,000 sets of stratiﬁed randomly sampled
arameter values. Each set corresponded to a unique plausible
ombination representing one individual in a virtual population of
0,000.
The age distributions of HPAIV H5N1 and LPAIV H7N9 cases of
oonotic infection in humans differ markedly, with 53% and 8%
f reported cases in individuals of less than 18 years old, respec-
ively [46,47]. Accordingly, each of the 10,000 virtual individuals
as further assigned an age category following a ratio of 1.12 chil-
ren to 1 adult when a zoonotic infection with HPAIV H5N1 was
ssumed. The ratio was 0.08:1 when a zoonotic infection with LPAIV
7N9 was assumed. Each of these virtual individuals was deﬁned
s immunocompetent or immunocompromised, with a ratio of
9:1, based on available estimates of the proportion of immuno-
ompromised individuals in the general population [25,48], when
nfection with HPAIV-H5N1 was assumed [49]. The ratio was 3:233 (2015) 6955–6966 6959
when infection with LPAIV-H7N9 was assumed, to reﬂect observed
proportions of LPAIV-H7N9 infected individuals with underlying
conditions [50]. Lastly, co-infection with seasonal IAV was  assumed
to occur—with equal probability—0 h, 12 h or 24 h after infection
with the zoonotic IAV.
For each of the virtual individuals, we  calculated (1) the proba-
bility of evolution of a variant with a speciﬁc set of 1–5 mutations
and (2) the probability of evolution of a speciﬁc re-assortant upon
co-infection with HPAIV H5N1 or LPAIV H7N9 and seasonal IAV. We
used bootstrap resampling to select 900 individuals from the virtual
population of 10,000 and repeated the process 10,000 times. For
each bootstrap sample, we randomly selected up to ten individuals
with the highest probability of evolution of a variant with a speciﬁc
set of 1–5 mutations or with the highest probability of evolution
of a speciﬁc re-assortant. We  then determined the distributions
of these probabilities—throughout the growth phase of infection.
This process generated quantile risk estimates that variants with
speciﬁc sets of 1–5 mutations and speciﬁc re-assortants evolve in
at least one individual after 900 cases of zoonotic infections with
either HPAIV H5N1 or LPAIV H7N9.
3. Results
3.1. Infection dynamics
The LHS and CLHS of IAV time and duration of peak replication
resulted in comparable IAV growth curves with different propor-
tions of late peaks and long peak plateaus (Figs. 2 and S1). The
constraints on the combinations of the infection model parameters
led to skewed distributions of time and duration of peak replication
toward lower values. Such distributions are not unlike observed
timelines of IAV infection in humans [26]. In general, the highest
numbers of virus copies produced at peak replication were asso-
ciated with early replication peak, high replication rates and low
peak proportions of infected cells. The relationships between the
time and duration of peak replication, peak number of virus copies,
peak proportion of infected cells and replication rate are shown in
Fig. S2.
The numbers of variants with speciﬁc sets of 1–5 mutations gen-
erally increased with the time of peak replication of the wild-type
virus (Fig. S3), with the duration of peak wild-type virus produc-
tion (Fig. S4), with the peak number of wild-type virus copies (Fig.
S5), with the polymerase error rate (Fig. S6) and with the respective
mutant replication rate (Fig. S7). Interestingly, the replication rate
of single mutants had more impact on the growth of any mutant
than the respective mutant replication rates (Fig. S8). Conversely,
the polymerase error rate had increasingly more impact on the
number of variants with more than one mutation than on the num-
ber of single mutants (Fig. S6).
The numbers of speciﬁc re-assortants generally increased with
the time of peak replication of the zoonotic virus (Fig. S9), with
the peak number of wild-type virus copies (Fig. S10), with the peak
number of infected cells (Fig. S11) and with the re-assortant replica-
tion rate (Fig. S12). The duration of peak wild-type virus production
had little impact on the numbers of speciﬁc re-assortants (Fig. S13).
3.2. Risk of evolution by accumulation of mutations
The range of parameter values explored in the LHS- and
CLHS-based models resulted in relatively high variability in the
probability distributions of evolution of variants with speciﬁc sets
of 1–5 mutations. Median values will be indicated in the text, while
quantiles will be reported in Table 2 and Table S1. In general, the
CLHS-based model resulted in lower probability of evolution of
variants with speciﬁc sets of 1–5 mutations. This was  largely due to
6960 L.A. Reperant et al. / Vaccine 33 (2015) 6955–6966
Table 2
Quantile probability of evolution and growth of variants with speciﬁc sets of 1–5 mutations at wild-type IAV replication peak (CLHS-based model).
# Host status Minimum 5% Median 95% Maximum
1 CP 100% (52%)† 100% (57%) 100% (63%) 100% (68%) 100% (78%)
1  IC 100% (53%) 100% (57%) 100% (62%) 100% (93%) 100% (100%)
2  CP 100% (5%) 100% (12%) 100% (24%) 100% (35%) 100% (45%)
2  IC 100% (6%) 100% (14%) 100% (57%) 100% (89%) 100% (100%)
3  CP <0.001% 0.01% 0.1% 100% (1%) 100% (15%)
3  IC 0.001% 0.02% 100% (25%) 100% (92%) 100% (100%)
4  CP <0.001% <0.001% <0.001% 0.001% 0.1%
4  IC <0.001% <0.001% 0.6% 100% (91%) 100% (100%)
5  CP <0.001% <0.001% <0.001% <0.001% <0.001%
5  IC <0.001% <0.001% <0.001% 100% (87%) 100% (100%)
† Percentage of peak replication log levels reached at replication peak indicated between brackets; #: number of mutations; CP: immunocompetent, IC: immunocompro-
mised.
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mig. 3. Growth curves (top) and probability (bottom) of evolution of variants wit
utations, in an immunocompetent individual (CLHS-based model). Data-points b
nd  of the plateau phase of peak viral production (pl.).
he skewer distributions of time and duration of peak replication
f the wild-type virus, and of the mutant relative replication rates,
oward lower values.
.2.1. Immunocompetent individuals
Both LHS- and CLHS-based models indicated a substantial risk of
volution, in one infected individual, of IAV with pandemic poten-
ial, when accumulation of 1–2 mutations was sufﬁcient to confer
irborne-transmissibility (Table 2). Variants with speciﬁc single
nd double mutations evolved in most individuals, when wild-type
oonotic IAV reached about 40% and 80% of wild-type virus peak
eplication levels, respectively (Figs. 3 and S14).
Speciﬁc single and double mutants that evolved before wild-
ype virus peak replication further grew and replicated to a
edian of 72% and 38% of wild-type virus peak replication levels,iﬁc sets of 1 (blue), 2 (dark blue), 3 (light blue), 4 (light green) or 5 (dark green)
 x = 0.1(top) and last boxplot (bottom) in each graph insert represent values at the
respectively, in the LHS-based model (Table 2). They grew and repli-
cated to a median of 63% and 24% of wild-type virus peak replication
levels, respectively, in the CLHS-based model (Table 2).
In both LHS- and CLHS-based models, variants with speciﬁc sets
of four or more mutations were unlikely to evolve during infec-
tion of an immunocompetent individual. The median probability
of evolution of variants with speciﬁc sets of four mutations was, at
the time of wild-type virus peak production, ≤0.001% in both types
of model (Figs. 3 and S14; Table 2).
By contrast, the likelihood that speciﬁc triple mutants evolved
during infection in an immunocompetent individual proved highly
uncertain. Variants with speciﬁc sets of three mutations evolved in
most individuals in the LHS-based model, while the median proba-
bility that they evolved in one individual was  1% in the CLHS-based
model (Figs. 3 and S14; Table 2). Because they generally evolved at
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Fig. 4. Growth curves (top) and probability (bottom) of evolution of speciﬁc re-assortants when both zoonotic and seasonal IAV initiated infection (light gray) to co-infection
with  a delay of up to 48 h (darker gray) in an immunocompetent individual (CLHS-based model). Data-points beyond x = 0.1 (top) and last boxplot (bottom) in each graph
insert  represent values at the end of the plateau phase of peak viral production (pl.).
Table 3
Quantile probability of evolution and growth of speciﬁc re-assortants at wild-type IAV replication peak (CLHS-based model).
T Host status Minimum 5% Median 95% Maximum
0 CP 100% (22%)† 100% (32%) 100% (45%) 100% (63%) 100% (79%)
0  IC 100% (22%) 100% (33%) 100% (51%) 100% (98%) 100% (100%)
12  CP 0.08% 1.2% 70% 100% (39%) 100% (69%)
12  IC 0.08% 3.0% 100% (37%) 100% (95%) 100% (100%)
24  CP 0.08% 0.8% 28% 100% (32%) 100% (61%)
24  IC 0.2% 1.8% 100% (21%) 100% (86%) 100% (100%)
36  CP 0.08% 0.6% 10% 100% (26%) 100% (44%)
36  IC 0.3% 0.9% 100% (16%) 100% (86%) 100% (98%)
48  CP 0.08% 0.8% 14% 100% (23%) 100% (42%)
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† Percentage of peak replication log levels reached at replication peak indicated bet
he time of wild-type virus peak replication, their further growth
as limited. They replicated to a median of 3% of wild-type virus
eak replication levels in the LHS-based model (Table S1).
.2.2. Immunocompromised individuals
The replication of IAV variants was unimpeded during the
eriod of wild-type virus peak production in immunocompromised
ndividuals. This resulted in the evolution and/or growth to high
eplication levels of variants with speciﬁc sets of 1–5 mutations
n most individuals in the LHS-based model (Figs. S15 and S16).
ariants with speciﬁc sets of 3–5 mutations reached ≥80% of the
ild-type peak replication levels by the end of the plateau phase
n that model (Table 2).
Variants with speciﬁc sets of three mutations evolved in most
mmunocompromised individuals in the CLHS-based model, and
rew and replicated to a median of 25% of the wild-type peak repli-
ation levels. The median probability that variants with speciﬁc sets100% (7%) 100% (86%) 100% (100%)
brackets; T: Time of co-infection; CP: immunocompetent, IC: immunocompromised.
of four and ﬁve mutations evolved in one immunocompromised
individual, during the peak virus production phase was  0.6% and
<0.0001%, respectively, in that model (Table 2).
3.3. Risk of evolution by re-assortment
3.3.1. Immunocompetent individuals
Any possible re-assortant was  generated in most immunocom-
petent individuals, at about 60% and 80% of wild-type IAV peak
replication levels, in the LHS- and CLHS-based model, respectively,
when both zoonotic and seasonal IAVs initiated infection at T = 0
(Figs. 4 and S17). Speciﬁc re-assortants that evolved before IAV peak
replication, further grew and replicated to a median of 68% and 45%
of peak replication levels, respectively (Table 3).
Speciﬁc re-assortants continued to evolve when the seasonal
IAV initiated infection 12–48 h after infection with the zoonotic
IAV, yet for a decreasing proportion of LHS and CLHS parameter
6962 L.A. Reperant et al. / Vaccine 33 (2015) 6955–6966
Fig. 5. (A) Proportion of combinations of LHS- (gray) and CLHS-based (red) parameter values resulting in the generation of re-assortants as a function of the delay between
zoonotic and seasonal IAV infection. (B) Proportion of immunocompromised individuals at the origin of variants with pandemic potential in the LHS- (gray) and CLHS-based
(red)  model of HPAIV-H5N1 infection.
Fig. 6. Quantitative risk estimates of evolution of mutants and re-assortants with pandemic potential after 900 cases of zoonotic infection (CLHS-based model of HPAIV-H5N1
i u pha
s ons, an
c
i
a
r
l
t
tnfection). Last boxplot in each graph insert represent values at the end of the platea
ets  of 1 (blue), 2 (dark blue), 3 (light blue), 4 (light green) or 5 (dark green) mutati
ombinations (Fig. 5). This is not unlike what has been described
n vitro and in vivo [38,40]. In the LHS-based model, speciﬁc re-
ssortants evolved in most immunocompetent individuals, and
eplicated to a median of 11–48% of wild-type virus peak replication
evels (Table S2). In the CLHS-based model, the median probability
hat speciﬁc re-assortants evolved during infection decreased with
he delay between infection with the zoonotic and seasonal IAVs,se of peak viral production (pl.). Risk estimates are shown for variants with speciﬁc
d re-assortants (gray).
from 70% when the delay was 12 h to 14% when the delay was 48 h
(Table 3).3.3.2. Immunocompromised individuals
Speciﬁc re-assortants had a higher probability to evolve in
immunocompromised than in immunocompetent individual at
the time of peak virus production. They replicated to higher
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Table  4
Quantile risk estimates of evolution and growth of mutants with pandemic potential at wild-type IAV replication peak after 900 cases of zoonotic IAV infection (CLHS-based
model of HPAIV-H5N1 infection).
# Host status Minimum 5% Median 95% Maximum
1 CP 100% (52%)† 100% (57%) 100% (63%) 100% (68%) 100% (78%)
1  IC 100% (54%) 100% (56%) 100% (62%) 100% (94%) 100% (98%)
2  CP 100% (5%) 100% (12%) 100% (24%) 100% (35%) 100% (44%)
2  IC 100% (7%) 100% (12%) 100% (29%) 100% (89%) 100% (99%)
3  CP 100% (<0.001%) 100% (0.3%) 100% (3%) 100% (8%) 100% (15%)
3  IC 100% (5%) 100% (44%) 100% (77%) 100% (92%) 100% (100%)
4  CP <0.001% <0.001% <0.001% 0.002% 0.005%
4  IC <0.001% 100% (10%) 100% (58%) 100% (95%) 100% (98%)
5  CP <0.001% <0.001% <0.001% <0.001% <0.001%
5  IC <0.001% 100% (3%) 100% (54%) 100% (95%) 100% (98%)
† Percentage of peak replication log levels reached at replication peak indicated between brackets; #: number of mutations; CP: immunocompetent, IC: immunocompro-
mised.
Table 5
Quantile risk estimates of evolution and growth of re-assortants with pandemic potential at wild-type IAV replication peak after 900 cases of zoonotic IAV infection
(CLHS-based model).
Host status Minimum 5% Median 95% Maximum
H5N1 CP <0.0001% (0.3%)† 0.0004% (2%) 0.02% (40%) 0.16% (63%) 0.22% (77%)
IC  <0.0001% (0.3%) 0.002% (9%) 0.04% (52%) 0.14% (93%) 0.14% (100%)
H7N9 CP  <0.0001% (0.3%) 0.002% (23%) 0.03% (45%) 0.20% (63%) 0.27% (77%)
0.8%) 
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† Percentage of peak replication log levels reached at replication peak indicated b
evels, in both the LHS- and CLHS-based models (Figs. S18 and S19;
ables 3 and S2).
.4. Quantitative risk estimates of evolution of a novel pandemic
AV by accumulation of mutations and by re-assortment
HPAIV-H5N1 and LPAIV-H7N9 have caused more than 800 and
lose to 700 cases of zoonotic infection, respectively. Using the LHS-
nd CLHS-based models described above, we determined the risk of
volution of IAV with pandemic potential by accumulation of muta-
ions and by re-assortment after 900 cases of zoonotic infection, as
n example. To this end, we used bootstrap resampling of the LHS-
nd CLHS-generated combinations of parameter values. The results
ere comparable for HPAIV-H5N1 and LPAIV-H7N9, although the
igh proportion of immunocompromised individuals in the popu-
ation infected with LPAIV-H7N9 resulted in more variable results
Figs. 6 and S20–S22).
The models produced high risks of evolution of variants with
andemic potential by accumulation of speciﬁc sets of 1–5 muta-
ions at the time of peak virus production (Figs. 6 and S20–S22).
he contribution of immunocompromised individuals in generat-
ng variants with pandemic potential increased with the number of
utations required for airborne-transmissibility (Fig. 5). In particu-
ar, all the individuals at the origin of the evolution of variants with
peciﬁc sets of 4–5 mutations in each of the bootstrap samples were
f immunocompromised status. In these individuals, variants with
–5 mutations replicated to a median of 78–84% of wild-type peak
eplication levels, in the LHS-based model (Table S3). They repli-
ated to a median of 29–77% of wild-type peak replication levels,
n the CLHS-based model (Table 4).
In immunocompetent individuals, variants with speciﬁc sets of
ne, two and three mutations replicated to a median of 71%, 38%,
nd 7% of wild-type peak replication levels, respectively, in the LHS-
ased model (Table S3). They replicated to a median of 63%, 24%,
nd 3% of wild-type peak replication levels in immunocompetent
ndividuals, respectively, in the CLHS-based model (Table 4).The median risk that co-infection with seasonal IAV occurred
nd that a re-assortant with pandemic potential evolved in
t least one individual after 900 cases of zoonotic infec-
ion was of the order of 0.02–0.1% for either HPAIV-H5N1 or0.03% (18%) 0.20% (51%) 0.27% (100%)
en brackets; CP: immunocompetent, IC: immunocompromised.
LPAIV-H7N9 (Tables 5 and S4). Re-assortants replicated up to
40–80% of wild-type peak replication levels in immunocompetent
and immunocompromised individuals (Tables 5 and S4).
4. Discussion
Quantifying the risk of evolution of a novel pandemic IAV,
enabling informed assessment of the likelihood of this public health
threat, is essential to support the implementation of pandemic
preparedness plans and policy decisions. For example, such quan-
titative framework may  assist in the identiﬁcation of individuals
most at risk of generating airborne-transmissible variants, call-
ing for the implementation of relevant isolation and handling
measures. The proposed approach allowed the computation of
quantitative risk estimates of the evolution of a transmissible IAV
during infection with zoonotic IAV, as a function of the number
of cases in humans. Similar evolutionary mechanisms likely drive
the evolution of IAVs in animal reservoirs, including mammalian
species such as the pig. However, zoonotic IAVs of avian or swine
origin typically cause sporadic infections in humans with limited
further onward transmission. They do not seem to acquire the
ability to be transmitted among humans via the air, despite their
widespread prevalence in animals, possibly due to different selec-
tion pressures. We therefore only considered the evolution of this
trait in the human host. Because of uncertainties in infection, evo-
lutionary, and epidemiological processes, absolute risks cannot at
present be assessed. In the present study, quantile risk estimates
were derived, by creating a virtual population of a large number of
combinations of model parameter values within best-known esti-
mates of their plausible range, and by repeatedly sampling this
population to generate risk distributions.
Although we accounted for variability in replication processes
and epidemiological dynamics, a number of caveats arose, due
to uncertainties that still cannot be fully captured. The distri-
butions of some of the model parameters call for more precise
empirical assessments that would allow narrowing the present risk
estimate ranges. Furthermore, variations in quasi-species ﬁtness
and interference between variants, e.g., immune- or resource-
mediated, may  directly affect the emergence of a transmissible
mutant or re-assortant [25,51]. The polymerase error rate may
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ary within and across gene segments, and not all re-assortment
ombinations may  have equal propensity to evolve [38,40]. Spa-
ial heterogeneities of IAV infection and mixing patterns within
osts, ignored here, are particularly important areas for future
mpirical studies, as they may  limit the extent of re-assortment
ithin hosts. Although the results of the present study are in line
ith recent experimental data on re-assortment [38,40], the use
f spatial models of the respiratory tract [52] may  be warranted.
t the population level, complex seasonal IAV epidemiological
ynamics, not captured by average attack rates [22], may  fur-
her inﬂuence the probability of co-infection. These include in
articular spatial and temporal variability in mixing patterns and
ndividual variability in susceptibility to infection and disease. We
artially addressed this issue with the use of gamma  distributions
f seasonal IAV attack rates. The ratio of immunocompromised indi-
iduals in the modeled populations was based on general estimates
hat do not reﬂect the amount of variability in the actual level
f immune control of infection. Lastly, the models only explored
he risk of evolution of variants with pandemic potential in indi-
idual hosts and did not address their further transmission from
uman to human, which is the next determining step in the risk of
mergence of an inﬂuenza pandemic. Greater quantitative under-
tanding of the relationships between viral loads, distribution of
AVs along the human respiratory tract and their onward transmis-
ion from human to human will be required to take on such an
ndeavor.
Despite these caveats, our results nonetheless provide indicative
ange estimates and robust relative risk estimates of the likeli-
ood that IAV with pandemic potential evolves by accumulation
f mutations or re-assortment in individual hosts. In particular,
hey provided risk estimate ranges according to the immune status
f infected individuals, bearing in mind that intermediate ranges
ikely are to be expected due to wide variability in the level of
mmune control in immunocompetent and immunocompromised
ndividuals.
So far, at least three to ﬁve mutations are thought necessary
o confer airborne transmissibility to some strains of HPAIV H5N1
9,11,12]. As an example, the proposed framework establishes that
he evolution of a variant with pandemic potential by accumula-
ion of three mutations would likely occur in at least one individual
mong 900 cases of infection (Table 4). However, the mutant may
each limited titers corresponding to about 3% (IC95: 0.3–8%) of
he log titers of the wild-type virus at peak replication in immuno-
ompetent individuals. In contrast, the risk of evolution of a variant
ith pandemic potential by accumulation of 4–5 mutations among
00 cases of infection was <0.001% (<0.001–0.005%) in immuno-
ompetent individuals. Conditions of immunodeﬁciency resulted
n the likely evolution of variants with 3–5 mutations among the
00 cases of infection, with titers reaching up to 77% (44–92%) for
riple mutants, 58% (10–95%) for variants with 4 mutations and 54%
3–95%) for variants with 5 mutations.
While the risk of co-infection with both zoonotic and seasonal
AVs in at least one individual among 900 cases of zoonotic infection
eached the order of 0.02–0.04% (0.0004–0.2%), reassortants were
ikely to evolve upon co-infection (Table 5). They could grow to
evels corresponding to 18–52% (0.8–93%) of the log titers of the
ild-type viruses at peak replication, in immunocompetent and
mmunocompromised individuals alike.
These results hereby complete earlier risk assessments of evo-
ution, emergence and transmission of pandemic inﬂuenza viruses.
he LHS- and CLHS-based models provided largely comparable
esults, attesting the robustness of the approach. In essence, three
ain conclusions may  be drawn from the results of the present
tudy.
First, the models strongly suggest that immunocompromised
ndividuals are at high risk of generating IAV variants with33 (2015) 6955–6966
pandemic potential by accumulation of mutations. In all boot-
strap samples, immunocompromised individuals were invariably
at the origin of the evolution of variants with speciﬁc sets of
four and ﬁve mutations. They also made a large proportion of
the individuals at the origin of the evolution of speciﬁc triple
mutants. In developed countries, an estimated 2% of the population
is immunocompromised, and on-going aging and increase in the
immunocompromised portion of the human population, including
in developing countries, are causes for concern [25,48].
Second, higher replication levels of single and double mutants
may  represent an important risk for the generation of a virus
variant with pandemic potential, along short chains of human-to-
human transmission. Because they evolve early during infection,
they reach relatively high replication levels in both immunocompe-
tent and immunocompromised individuals. Rare human-to-human
transmission of zoonotic IAVs associated with unusually intense
contacts [53] may  result in their transmission. Subsequent evolu-
tionary processes leading to 1–2 additional mutations are to be
expected in secondary cases. These could complete the genotype
of a fully-transmissible variant, expanding the risk of evolu-
tion by accumulation of mutations, supporting earlier models of
population-level emergence of infectious diseases [14,24]. It is
tempting to speculate that the results of the present models likely
apply to other mammalian species, such as swine, cats and dogs.
Chains of transmission in these species may  contribute to the evo-
lution of variants with pandemic potential by accumulation of
mutations, provided that selective pressures are similar to those
in humans.
Third, although the risk of evolution of IAV with pandemic
potential by re-assortment appeared overall lower than the risk
of evolution by accumulation of mutations, re-assortants evolved
early during infection, and reached high peak replication levels
in both immunocompetent and immunocompromised individuals.
This may  facilitate their subsequent transmission to a new individ-
ual. Although a rare event, co-infection with zoonotic and seasonal
IAV less than 24 h apart would likely give rise to a wide diversity
and high viral loads of re-assortants, some of which with pandemic
potential. This may  spark chains of human-to-human transmission.
Interestingly, the higher range estimates of the risk of evolution of
a variant with pandemic potential by re-assortment were in line
with past inter-pandemic periods ranging between 9 and 41 years
[1].
Some HPAIV-H5N1 isolates have demonstrated binding afﬁnity
for cellular receptors commonly used by seasonal IAVs [53]. They
may  infect the same cell type and re-assort in humans. Of particular
concern, LPAIVs-H7N9, in contrast to HPAIVs-H5N1 and most other
avian IAVs, consistently bind to the cellular receptors used by sea-
sonal IAVs [54], and thus may  readily re-assort upon co-infection.
A majority of both HPAIV-H5N1 and LPAIV-H7N9 cases of zoonotic
infection have occurred during January–March, corresponding to
high seasonal IAV activity in the Northern hemisphere (Fig. S23). In
this light, the patients infected with HPAIV-H5N1 or LPAIV-H7N9,
who traveled from China to Canada in winter 2014 and winter 2015,
respectively[55,56], during high seasonal inﬂuenza activity, illus-
trates that the risk of co-infection and re-assortment is not only
theoretical.
Prompt diagnosis, strict isolation, monitoring and antiviral
treatment of patients with zoonotic inﬂuenza is warranted to
limit the risk of evolution of a novel pandemic IAV. In particular,
strict isolation measures and early antiviral treatment are essen-
tial to prevent or limit zoonotic IAV infection in (hospitalized)
immunocompromised individuals, as well as in contact individuals,
including health care workers and relatives. Importantly, vaccina-
tion against seasonal IAVs may  reduce the risk of co-infection, and
thus may  represent a fundamental tool to prevent the evolution of
a novel pandemic IAV by re-assortment.
ccine 
A
y
a
d
R
m
n
t
a
t
A
d
n
p
o
D
a
E
#
B
o
p
L
A
t
0
R
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[L.A. Reperant et al. / Va
uthor contributions
L.A.R. collected data, developed the models, performed the anal-
ses and wrote the paper, with input from B.T.G. and A.D.M.E.O. All
uthors were involved in the design of the modeling framework,
iscussed the results and their implications.
ole of the funding source
The funding source had no role in the study, writing of the
anuscript or decision to submit for publication. The authors have
ot been paid by a pharmaceutical company or another agency
o write this manuscript. L.A.R., as corresponding author, had full
ccess to all the data in the study and had ﬁnal responsibility for
he decision to submit for publication.
cknowledgments
The authors thank G. Rimmelzwaan and M.D. Polichtchouk for
iscussions. L.A.R. was supported by EU FP7 Marie-Curie Inter-
ational Incoming Fellowship #302060; B.T.G. by the RAPIDD
rogram of the Science and Technology Directorate Department
f Homeland Security and the Fogarty International Center, NIH,
epartment of Homeland Security contract HSHQDC-12-C-00058
nd the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation; and A.D.M.E.O. by
U FP7 EMPERIE project #223498 and EU FP7 ANTIGONE project
278976.
Conﬂict of interest: A.D.M.E.O. is part-time CSO of Viroclinics-
iosciences BV, a spin-off of Erasmus MC  and he is a board member
f Protein Sciences. He provides ad hoc expert advice to public and
rivate entities involved in the area of human and veterinary health.
.A.R. and B.T.G. declare no conﬂicts of interest.
ppendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data associated with this article can be found, in
he online version, at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.vaccine.2015.10.
56.
eferences
[1] Taubenberger JK, Kash JC. Inﬂuenza virus evolution, host adaptation, and pan-
demic formation. Cell Host Microbe 2010;7(6):440–51.
[2] Reperant LA, Kuiken T, Osterhaus AD. Adaptive pathways of zoonotic
inﬂuenza viruses: from exposure to establishment in humans. Vaccine
2012;30(30):4419–34.
[3] Drake JW.  Rates of spontaneous mutation among RNA viruses. Proc Natl Acad
Sci  U S A 1993;90(9):4171–5.
[4] Rambaut A, Pybus OG, Nelson MI,  Viboud C, Taubenberger JK, Holmes EC. The
genomic and epidemiological dynamics of human inﬂuenza A virus. Nature
2008;453(7195):615–9.
[5] Sorrell EM,  Wan  H, Araya Y, Song H, Perez DR. Minimal molecular constraints
for respiratory droplet transmission of an avian-human H9N2 inﬂuenza A virus.
Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 2009;106(18):7565–70.
[6] Imai K, Nakamura K, Mase M,  Tsukamoto K, Imada T, Yamaguchi S. Experimental
adaptation of an inﬂuenza H5 HA confers respiratory droplet transmission to a
reassortant H5 HA/H1N1 virus in ferrets. Nature 2012;486(7403):420–8.
[7] Zhang Y, Zhang Q, Kong H, Jiang Y, Gao Y, Deng G, et al. H5N1 hybrid viruses
bearing 2009/H1N1 virus genes transmit in guinea pigs by respiratory droplet.
Science 2013;340(6139):1459–63.
[8] Kimble JB, Angel M, Wan  H, Sutton TC, Finch C, Perez DR. Alternative reas-
sortment events leading to transmissible H9N1 inﬂuenza viruses in the ferret
model. J Virol 2014;88:66–71.
[9] Herfst S, Schrauwen EJ, Linster M, Chutinimitkul S, de Wit  E, Munster VJ,
et  al. Airborne transmission of inﬂuenza A/H5N1 virus between ferrets. Science
2012;336(6088):1534–41.10] Zhang Q, Shi J, Deng G, Guo J, Zeng X, He X, et al. H7N9 inﬂuenza viruses are
transmissible in ferrets by respiratory droplet. Science 2013;341(6144):410–4.
11] Linster M,  van Boheemen S, de Graaf M,  Schrauwen EJ, Lexmond P, Manz B,
et  al. Identiﬁcation, characterization, and natural selection of mutations driving
airborne transmission of A/H5N1 virus. Cell 2014;157(2):329–39.
[
[33 (2015) 6955–6966 6965
12] Sutton TC, Finch C, Shao H, Angel M,  Chen H, Capua I, et al. Airborne
transmission of highly pathogenic H7N1 inﬂuenza virus in ferrets. J Virol
2014;88(12):6623–35.
13] Russell CA, Fonville JM, Brown AE, et al. The potential for respiratory droplet-
transmissible A/H5N1 inﬂuenza virus to evolve in a mammalian host. Science
2012;336(6088):1541–7.
14] Lloyd-Smith JO, George D, Pepin KM,  et al. Epidemic dynamics at the
human–animal interface. Science 2009;326(5958):1362–7.
15] Wikramaratna PS, Kucharski A, Gupta S, Andreasen V, McLean AR, Gog JR.
Five challenges in modelling interacting strain dynamics. Epidemics 2015;10:
31–4.
16] Dushoff J, Plotkin JB, Levin SA, Earn DJ. Dynamical resonance can
account for seasonality of inﬂuenza epidemics. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A
2004;101(48):16915–6.
17] Ferguson NM, Galvani AP, Bush RM.  Ecological and immunological determi-
nants of inﬂuenza evolution. Nature 2003;422(6930):428–33.
18] Koelle K, Cobey S, Grenfell B, Pascual M.  Epochal evolution shapes the
phylodynamics of interpandemic inﬂuenza A (H3N2) in humans. Science
2006;314(5807):1898–903.
19] Koelle K, Kamradt M,  Pascual M.  Understanding the dynamics of rapidly evolv-
ing pathogens through modeling the tempo of antigenic change: inﬂuenza as
a  case study. Epidemics 2009;1(2):129–37.
20] Koelle K, Khatri P, Kamradt M,  Kepler TB. A two-tiered model for simulating
the ecological and evolutionary dynamics of rapidly evolving viruses, with an
application to inﬂuenza. J R Soc Interface 2010;7(50):1257–74.
21] Axelsen JB, Yaari R, Grenfell BT, Stone L. Multiannual forecasting of seasonal
inﬂuenza dynamics reveals climatic and evolutionary drivers. Proc Natl Acad
Sci U S A 2014;111(26):9538–42.
22] Ferguson NM,  Cummings DA, Cauchemez S, Fraser C, Riley S, Meeyai A, et al.
Strategies for containing an emerging inﬂuenza pandemic in Southeast Asia.
Nature 2005;437(7056):209–14.
23] Longini Jr IM,  Halloran ME,  Nizam A, Yang Y. Containing pandemic inﬂuenza at
the source. Science 2005;309(5737):1083–7.
24] Kubiak RJ, Arinaminpathy N, McLean AR. Insights into the evolution and emer-
gence of a novel infectious disease. PLoS Comput Biol 2010;6(9).
25] Reperant LA, Kuiken T, Grenfell BT, Osterhaus AD. The immune response
and within-host emergence of pandemic inﬂuenza virus. Lancet
2008;834(7):2077–81.
26] Carrat F, Vergu E, Ferguson NM,  Lemaitre M,  Cauchemez S, Leach S, et al. Time
lines of infection and disease in human inﬂuenza: a review of volunteer chal-
lenge studies. Am J Epidemiol 2008;167(7):775–85.
27] Nakajima N, Van Tin N, Sato Y, Thach HN, Katano H, Diep PH, et al. Patho-
logical study of archival lung tissues from ﬁve fatal cases of avian H5N1
inﬂuenza in Vietnam. Modern Pathol: Off J US Can Acad Pathol Inc 2013;26(3):
357–69.
28] Zhou JJ, Fang DY, Fu J, Tian J, Zhou JM,  Yan HJ,  et al. Infection and repli-
cation of avian inﬂuenza H5N1 virus in an infected human. Virus Genes
2009;39(1):76–80.
29] Sirinonthanawech N, Uiprasertkul M,  Suptawiwat O, Auewarakul P. Viral load
of  the highly pathogenic avian inﬂuenza H5N1 virus in infected human tissues.
J  Med  Virol 2011;83(8):1418–23.
30] van der Vries E, Stittelaar KJ, van Amerongen G, Veldhuis Kroeze EJ, de
Waal L, Fraaij PL, et al. Prolonged inﬂuenza virus shedding and emergence of
antiviral resistance in immunocompromised patients and ferrets. PLoS Pathog
2013;9(5):e1003343.
31] Rimmelzwaan GF, Baars M,  Claas EC, Osterhaus AD. Comparison of RNA
hybridization, hemagglutination assay, titration of infectious virus and
immunoﬂuorescence as methods for monitoring inﬂuenza virus replication in
vitro. J Virol Methods 1998;74(1):57–66.
32] Nowak MA, May  RM.  Virus dynamics: mathematical principles of immunology
and  virology. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2000.
33] Murcia PR, Baillie GJ, Daly J, Elton D, Jervis C, Mumford JA, et al. Intra-
and interhost evolutionary dynamics of equine inﬂuenza virus. J Virol
2010;84(14):6943–54.
34] Murcia PR, Hughes J, Battista P, Lloyd L, Baillie GJ, Ramirez-Gonzalez RH, et al.
Evolution of an Eurasian avian-like inﬂuenza virus in naive and vaccinated pigs.
PLoS Pathog 2012;8(5):e1002730.
35] Massin P, van der Werf S, Naffakh N. Residue 627 of PB2 is a determi-
nant of cold sensitivity in RNA replication of avian inﬂuenza viruses. J Virol
2001;75(11):5398–404.
36] Gabriel G, Abram M,  Keiner B, Wagner R, Klenk HD, Stech J. Differential
polymerase activity in avian and mammalian cells determines host range of
inﬂuenza virus. J Virol 2007;81(17):9601–4.
37] Antia R, Regoes RR, Koella JC, Bergstrom CT. The role of evolution in the emer-
gence of infectious diseases. Nature 2003;426(6967):658–61.
38] Marshall N, Priyamvada L, Ende Z, Steel J, Lowen AC. Inﬂuenza virus reassort-
ment occurs with high frequency in the absence of segment mismatch. PLoS
Pathog 2013;9(6):e1003421.
39] Bodewes R, Nieuwkoop NJ, Verburgh RJ, Fouchier RA, Osterhaus AD, Rim-
melzwaan GF. Use of inﬂuenza A viruses expressing reporter genes to assess
the frequency of double infections in vitro. J Gen Virol 2012;93(Pt 8):1645–8.40] Tao H, Steel J, Lowen AC. Intrahost dynamics of inﬂuenza virus reassortment. J
Virol 2014;88(13):7485–92.
41] Molinari NA, Ortega-Sanchez IR, Messonnier ML,  Thompson WW,  Wortley PM,
Weintraub E, et al. The annual impact of seasonal inﬂuenza in the US:  measuring
disease burden and costs. Vaccine 2007;25(27):5086–96.
6 ccine 
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
2013;499(7459):496–9.966 L.A. Reperant et al. / Va
42] Wu JT, Ma  ES, Lee CK, Chu DK, Ho PL, Shen AL, et al. The infection attack rate
and severity of 2009 pandemic H1N1 inﬂuenza in Hong Kong. Clin Infect Dis
2010;51(10):1184–91.
43] Lemaitre M,  Carrat F. Comparative age distribution of inﬂuenza morbidity and
mortality during seasonal inﬂuenza epidemics and the 2009 H1N1 pandemic.
BMC  Infect Dis 2010;10:162.
44] Blower SM, Dowlatabadi H. Sensitivity and uncertainty analysis of com-
plex models of disease transmission: an HIV model, as an example. Int Stat
Rev/Revue Internationale de Statistique 1994;62(2), 229-43 CR.
45] Minasny B, McBratney AB. A conditioned Latin hypercube method for
sampling in the presence of ancillary information. Computers Geosci
2006;32(9):1378–88.
46] Chen JM,  Chen JW,  Dai JJ, Sun YX. A survey of human cases of H5N1 avian
inﬂuenza reported by the WHO  before June 2006 for infection control. Am J
Infect Control 2007;35(7):467–9.
47] To KK, Chan JF, Chen H, Li L, Yuen KY. The emergence of inﬂuenza A H7N9 in
human beings 16 years after inﬂuenza A H5N1: a tale of two cities. Lancet Infect
Dis 2013;13(9):809–21.
48] Kunisaki KM,  Janoff EN. Inﬂuenza in immunosuppressed populations: a review
of  infection frequency, morbidity, mortality, and vaccine responses. Lancet
Infect Dis 2009;9(8):493–504.
[
[33 (2015) 6955–6966
49] Uyeki TM.  Human infection with highly pathogenic avian inﬂuenza A (H5N1)
virus: review of clinical issues. Clin Infect Dis 2009;49(2):279–90.
50] Gao HN, Lu HZ, Cao B, Du B, Shang H, Gan JH, et al. Clinical ﬁndings in
111 cases of inﬂuenza A (H7N9) virus infection. N Engl J Med 2013;368(24):
2277–85.
51] Domingo E, Holland JJ. RNA virus mutations and ﬁtness for survival. Annu Rev
Microbiol 1997;51:151–78.
52] Reperant LA, Kuiken T, Grenfell BT, Osterhaus ADME, Dobson AP. Linking
inﬂuenza virus tissue tropism to population-level reproductive ﬁtness. PLoS
ONE 2012;7(8):e43115.
53] Abdel-Ghafar AN, Chotpitayasunondh T, Gao Z, Hayden FG,  Nguyen DH,  de Jong
MD,  et al. Update on avian inﬂuenza A (H5N1) virus infection in humans. N Engl
J  Med  2008;358(3):261–73.
54] Xiong X, Martin SR, Haire LF, Wharton SA, Daniels RS, Bennett MS,
et  al. Receptor binding by an H7N9 inﬂuenza virus from humans. Nature55] ProMED-mail. Avian Inﬂuenza, human (10): Canada ex China (Beijing) H5N1,
Fatal 2014; 20140108.2160514.
56] ProMED-mail. Avian Inﬂuenza, Human (23): China (Guangdong) H7N9, Canada
ﬁrst case. 2015; 20150126.3120361.
